Hand counting elections is a very heated topic with passionate voices on both sides. In 2023 the GOP County Executive Committee (CEC) of Gillespie County voted to hand count its 2024 Republican Primary election. The Travis County GOP also sought to hand count that election, but restricted the scope to mail-in ballots. Now more counties are moving toward hand counting or at least investigating the possibility.
The counties that move to hand counting will be under a microscope. If an attempt goes wrong it will be much harder to try again. The security of the election and the future of hand counting as an option are at stake. It is crucial to get it right the first time.
We will examine some of the challenges CECs must confront when choosing to hand count. This is not an exhaustive list. There are numerous other issues to consider, especially if the party is not contracting with the county and is running its own election. Some are addressed HERE. Others are better addressed by those with the experience of hand counting in Gillespie County and Travis County.
This document is not intended to discourage hand counting or champion electronic voting. It is meant to ensure that Primary Committees working to build the best elections possible for their party in their county consider all aspects of hand counting before making a decision. Some counties will find a much easier transition than others. Some are very passionate about hand counting while others have no desire to take that step. It is crucial to see the whole picture and make an informed decision the voters can trust.
When choosing a voting method we must start with the fact that elections have never been perfect, and they probably never will be. The simple act of citizens casting a vote and those votes being counted to determine a winner has never actually been that simple.
People have used coercion, manipulation, and fraud to influence the outcome of elections since they were invented. In the last 100 years there have been the infamous stories of Boss Tweed and Tammany Hall in 1920s New York, Chicago’s Mayor Daley in the 1960s, and of course LBJ and the “extra” votes in Box 13 in Jim Wells County, Texas in 1948. 2020 wasn’t anything new, it was just done on a larger scale. It’s cliche, but “cheaters gonna cheat,” and it’s our job to minimize the opportunity to cheat as much as possible.
Each of Texas’s 254 counties has its own unique challenges and threats to the integrity of its elections. Their solutions should be tailored to fit. What works in San Saba County with fewer than 4,000 registered voters may not work in Van Zandt with about 40,000 or in Williamson County with over 400,000. This is a feature of Texas Elections, not a flaw.
*Disclaimers*
This document is just a guide. Advancing Integrity is not a legal firm and cannot give legal advice. Always refer to the Texas Election Code, Texas Secretary of State, and your County Elections Office.
The Basics of the Count
Ballot counting procedures are outlined in Chapter 65 of the Texas Election Code. It requires one or more teams of at least two election officers, assigned by the presiding judge of that polling location. One person announces the names while the others tally the votes. Those teams must complete three original tally lists, comparing them periodically to find discrepancies.
Counting may begin at least one hour after voting has started on Election Day, but there must be at least ten votes cast first. Two rotating ballot boxes allow for counting during voting. Chapter 65 goes on to outline the procedures for over-votes, write ins, provisional ballots, and other anomalies. It seems simple, but to execute the process accurately and securely many other aspects of the count must be taken into consideration.
The County Party will need to be in contact with the Elections Department of the Office of the Secretary of State to ensure compliance with their guidelines and the Texas Election Code. The County Party will also need to consult an election law attorney to avoid potential violations and lawsuits.
Building an Army
The Election Code requires teams of a minimum of two people, but three original tally lists. This means that a team of two would have one person calling out the names and marking a tally list while the other marks two tally lists at once, or one calling and the other marking three lists at once. That seems to defeat the purpose of having three tally lists. It also opens the process up to a lot of human error. Teams of three would remove some of that risk, but would still result in the caller doubling as a tallier or one tallier completing two tally lists.
Teams of four would allow the caller to focus on the accuracy of that job alone and lead the team while each tallier would only be responsible for one tally list. Teams of five would add a fifth person serving as an observer, ensuring that the caller is calling the correct name. With their heads down in their tally lists, the others would be unlikely to know if the caller makes a mistake or is attempting fraud. A team of three or four could work for counting the early voting ballots and ballots voted by mail. That process would likely have all counting teams in one location and poll watchers could roam the room ensuring accuracy.
We are not aware of a study showing exactly how team size affects the count, but logic leads to the idea that four or five per team should be the standard. Accuracy, security, and accountability seem to increase as each team member is added up to five, but so does the cost of the election. Each additional person adds to the area needed at the location, the funds needed to pay them, and the amount of training required. If a county typically has polling locations with 5 election workers each, it will now need 10 workers each, doubling the cost.
The fatigue of the counting team must also be considered. Counting is a tedious process and counting for 12 hours would wear down anyone. Shifting is an option, but it exponentially increases the number of people needed and the number of people that will have to be trained. There is also a risk that the earlier shift could leak early results.
There is an option to wait and count the Election Day ballots after the polls close. The poll workers would then become the counting team or teams. This saves on recruitment and potentially the amount of space needed, but the sharpness of the poll workers after a grueling 14 hour day would be questionable. Remember, sacrificing team size for a lack of funding or recruitment will erode the integrity of the election.
Republicans in Gillespie County hand counted their 8,000 Primary ballots over the course of about 22 hours with 250 volunteers. The county has a population around 27,000 and 15 voting precincts. Other counties around their size may require similar numbers and may experience similar success.
The numbers needed for a larger county would grow exponentially. Williamson County, for example, has a population of over 700,000 and 176 precincts. Approximately 55,000 ballots were cast in the 2024 Primary. Williamson County would need almost 5,000 people to hand count its Primary Election on top of the hundreds needed for the voting process itself. That is a massive number of people to recruit, train, and oversee.
Location, Location, Location
Early voting ballots cast in person and by mail would be hand counted at a central location by the Early Voting Ballot Board (EVBB). The necessary counting teams would greatly increase the size of the EVBB and the size of the room or rooms necessary for the count. For Early Voting that would mean an auditorium or conference center filled with tables that would have to be spaced far enough apart to keep talliers from being thrown off by other callers.
Choosing the hand count method could make finding Election Day polling locations more challenging. First of all, voting will have to be precinct-based, each voter will have only one designated polling location. Certain smaller precincts can be combined, but there are restrictions based on size, ballot style, and district.
Counties that never participated in the countywide polling program are at an advantage here. If the county is currently using countywide polling, where the voter may vote at any location in the county, going back to precinct-based polling will likely increase the number of polling locations that will have to be found, rented, and staffed.
The requirements for the polling locations would also change. Voting and counting would take place in the same location and at the same time. The counting team cannot be in close proximity to the voters, however, hearing the names of candidates being called could influence their vote. In most cases this would mean a separate room for the counting and many locations may not have this option.
Accuracy and Security
The risk of human error grows with the number of times each ballot is handled. For tally lists to be legible they can only have a few races per sheet so only a few races can be counted at a time. If a sheet holds four races and the ballot has 20 races, that batch of ballots will have to be counted five times on 5 different sheets. That’s a lot of paper when multiplied across hundreds or thousands of batches of 25 or 50 ballots each.
Chain of custody is crucial in any election and cannot be ignored when hand counting. Forms to track every change of hands and every time a seal is broken must be developed. The forms must track the serial numbers of both the cut seal and the new seal as well as the signatures of both parties in the exchange of custody. Tally lists should have the name and signature of the person marking it for accountability. Each batch should be inside a tamper-evident sealed bag as it moves through the process.
Thinking Like a Criminal
Police officers study how people commit crimes in order to prevent them so advocates for election integrity must think like fraudsters to prevent election fraud. There are aspects of hand counting that leave the door wide open for fraud, but those can be reduced with proper procedures in place.
The largest threat to security when hand counting involves hand marked ballots. Since the beginning of hand marking ballots there have been reports of the “short pencil” method of cheating. This was where a vote counter would hide pencil lead under a fingernail and fill in undervotes or overvote a race to cancel out a vote for an opponent. The same can happen today if the proper controls are not in place.
Imagine you have a counting team of two and both those people are supporting the same slate of candidates. (This is a Primary Election so you don’t have the option of one Democrat and one Republican.) You then have the counting taking place in a separate room from the voting so those two people are typically alone. The Presiding Judge rarely enters the room to check on the counters because the voting is moving at a steady pace so there is very little oversight. We would like to think that everyone is honest, but the door is wide open for fraud and the temptation is there. Those two people could easily fill in under-votes and over-vote while no one is looking and they could easily get away with it. The ballots aren’t scanned before counting so there would be no way of knowing they were altered. The callers could also just ignore how the ballots are marked and call out their preferred candidates’ names instead. The talliers could be honest people with their heads down in their work and never know the difference.
These threats can be mitigated, but it is crucial to know that they exist. Larger counting teams would reduce the risk that all involved would be willing to cheat for the same candidate. Also, the more people involved in a conspiracy, the more likely it is someone will talk about it and get everyone caught. Poll watchers appointed by candidates would also help keep everyone honest. Cameras are another route to deterring fraud, but they are also an added expense. Also, the cameras shouldn’t just be on the ballots, ensuring the callers are honest or not making mistakes. They should also be filming the whole room to ensure chain of custody and that the counting team only has red and blue ink pens that would not match the black ink used by voters.
Remember, unlike a machine count, there is no automatic partial count to verify a hand count. The only mechanisms for verifying the work of the hand counters would be a recount requested by a candidate at that candidate’s expense or an expensive election contest. If there was fraud or human error in the hand count it may not ever be detected. Right now we have the machine count and then a hand count audit that randomly checks the accuracy of a portion of the machine count. We even have the option of hand counting the entire election in the audit.
Communication
Last, but certainly not least, is the crucial component of communication. Don’t forget that not everyone will be excited about hand counting and people fear change. The County Party must be prepared to communicate how and why these changes are happening in a positive way. There will be opposition to the hand count and a change like this should not be forced on an unwilling population or the trust in elections will be damaged even further.
Convey the strength of the planning to reassure voters and candidates. Seek the buy-in of candidates. That will go a long way toward securing the buy-in of the public. Remember, the candidates are most likely to seek legal action if something goes wrong with the count. Also, they are putting their blood, sweat, and tears into their campaigns and their thoughts and opinions deserve to be heard. Don’t discount the voters either. Get them on board, get them excited, it will certainly help with recruiting.